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Harvey: Contracts, Bills and Notes, and Sales

CONTRACTS, BILLS AND NOTES, AND SALES

W. BRANTLEY HARVEY, JR.*
I. CONTRACTS

In Hood v. Gordy Homes, Inc.,' the action arose out of a
contract wherein the defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff for services rendered one-half of all dividends and profits
received from a subsidiary corporation until the sum of
$25,000.00 was paid. The U. S. Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit, affirmed the dismissal of the suit by the District
Court, holding that the contract required payment from a
particular fund and therefore did not create an absolute
liability and that since the defendant had derived no funds
from the subsidiary corporation, the plaintiff had no cause
of action.
In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that if
there had been a pre-existing debt which the defendant had
subsequently agreed to pay upon the contingency of the dividends being received, then the debt would become payable
within a reasonable time, even if the contingency had not
occurred. In the subject case, the services of the plaintiff
were performed contemporaneously with the contract and
the payment was to be conditional as set forth in the contract, and since the condition had not occurred, the District
Court properly dismissed the suit.
The Supreme Court sustained the demurrer of the defendant in Reid v. George Washington Life Ins. Co., 2 wherein
the plaintiff, an eighty year old lady, sought damages for
fraud of defendant's agent in representing to her that health
and hospital insurance policy covered doctors' calls and ambulance service when in fact it did not.
It was reasoned that even if the statements were made
there was no actionable fraud because the complaint showed
on its face that the plaintiff had held the policy for about
seven years and had ample opportunity to learn the truth as
to what the policy contained. This case drives home the point
*Member of firm, Harvey and Harvey, Beaufort, S. C.
1. 267 F. 2d 882 (4th Cir. 1959).
2. 234 S. C. 599, 109 S. E. 2d 577 (1959).
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that the facts showing fraud must be pleaded and that in
order to overcome the rule "that ordinarily one who holds
a written instrument can ascertain the truth of the contents,"
it is necessary to allege and prove that the plaintiff was not
able to avoid the deception due to his or her ignorance, illiteracy, incapacity or other reason.
The case of Jones v. Cooper3 was an action by a purchaser
of hot dog vending machines for actual and punitive damages
against the seller for fraud and deceit arising out of the
contract. The case adds nothing new to the well established
law on the subject, but contains a good review of the nine
elements that a plaintiff must prove to establish fraud, and
the degree of proof necessary. The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and ordered judgment entered for
defendant upon the grounds that the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were merely "puffing" or "sales talk," related to future matters, and that the truth could have been
ascertained from the written agreement which plaintiff signed, and which merged all prior negotiations.
Turbeville v. Gordon4 was an action brought by a builder
against the owner of real estate to recover for balance due
on the construction of a home. The case was previously before the Supreme Court as reported in 223 S. C. 75, 103 S. E.
2d 521 (1958) 5 wherein the demurrer of the defendant was
overruled. In the instant case, the circuit court had granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that it was barred by the Statute of Frauds in that
the claim was founded upon the defendant's oral promise to
pay on behalf of her daughter and son-in-law the debt owed
for the construction. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's order and remanded the case, stating that the complaint alleged a debt of the defendant and that her contention
that this was an oral promise to pay the debts of others had
been rejected by the Supreme Court in the earlier appeal and
this was now the law of the case.
The Court pointed out that the only method by which a
builder may enforce his lien upon a building is through the
statutory proceeding relating to mechanic's liens, but that an
action upon the contract could be maintained by the builder as
3. 234 S. C. 477, 109 S. E. 2d 5 (1959).
4. 236 S. C. 57, 113 S. E. 2d 68 (1960).

5. See generally Wyche, Contracts, Bills and Notes, and Sales, 12
S. C. L. Q. 22 (1959).
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if he had no lien. The action here was on the contract rather
than on the theory of a mechanic's lien and for that reason
the court sustained the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for
the reasonable value of the use of the property by the defendant after its completion.
South CarolinaFin. Corp. v. West Side Fin. Co. 6 arose out
of the purchase of the defendant's small loan company by
the plaintiff and a written agreement that the defendant
would not engage in a competing small loan business for three
years within a radius of 25 miles of the business sold. As
a part of the consideration, the plaintiff gave to the defendant a note which contained the provision that any loss sustained or legal expenses incurred as a result of the breach
of the agreement would be deducted therefrom. The Supreme
Court upheld an injunction against the defendant's subsequent competing operation and the award of damages to the
plaintiff after offset of the amount of the note.
In its well reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court held (1)
that the covenant not to compete was not detrimental to
public interest, since, even though it reduced by one the
number of small loan lenders in the area, there still remained
26 companies to serve the public and additional licenses
could be granted if community need was shown; (2) the
covenant was ancillary to the sale of the business since it
was the clear intent of the agreement that plaintiff acquire
the entire small loan business of the defendant even though
transfer of good will was not specifically mentioned in the
agreement and certain other minor assets were retained by
the defendant seller; (3) the covenant was reasonably limited
as to time and territory since borrowers on the company's
books resided throughout the territory encompassed by the 25
mile radius; and (4) the covenant was supported by valuable
consideration even though the note given as part of the consideration was totally offset by damages awarded the plaintiff. Having found that the four requirements of a covenant
not to compete had been met, the Court correctly sustained it.
The authority of a real estate agent or broker to bind the
property owner he represents by a contract of sale to a
prospective purchaser was at issue in Gallnt v. Todd. 7 The
Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court's
6. 236 S. C. 109, 113 S. E. 2d 329 (1960).

7. 235 S. C. 428, 111 S. E. 2d 779 (1960).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1961

3

312

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 4

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 13

sustaining of the defendant owner's demurrer to the plaintiff
purchaser's action for specific performance of a contract for
the sale of land made by the real estate broker. The agreement stated that the agents would get the commission if the
property was sold "by them or by anyone else" and the Court
held that this clearly showed the intention that the owner
retained the right to sell. The agreement also provided that
the agent would get a commission on "$60,000.00 or price
accepted for said property", thereby leaving open for further negotiations the final sales price. Based on these points
the agreement failed to distinctly and clearly authorize the
agent to enter into a contract of sale binding on the owner.
The agreement authorized the agent to find a purchaser for
the property and entitled him to a commission for that service, but it gave him no right to bind the owner. The Court
tried to distinguish the present case from the case of Wharton
v. Tolbert, 84 S. C. 197, 65 S. E. 1056 (1909), wherein such
a contract was upheld by differentiating between the language used in the agreement. However, the language is very
similar and this appears to be somewhat of a pulling back
from the position of the Court in the Wharton case.,
The point for the practicing attorney, of course, is that
if it is the desire or intent of the seller to give the agent
the right to enter a binding contract of sale on his behalf,
it should be very clearly and specifically stated in the agreement.
In Graves v. Garvin", an action brought by a strage company against one of its customers for foreclosure of the customer's mortgage, the customer asserted a counterclaim for
set-off of goods stored with the company. The chief question
on appeal was the admissibility in evidence of certain account
books of the plaintiff which were made up or compiled from
slips or memoranda made at the time of the transaction;
which books the court held were the first permanent records
and therefore "books of original entry". Of interest on the
question of contracts was the Court's finding that the inventory receipts given by the plaintiff warehouseman when the
defendant deposited the goods with him, were not warehouse
receipts since they failed to meet certain of the requirements
of the Georgia Warehouse Act. Not being warehouse receipts,
8. 272 F. 2d 924 (4th Cir. 1959).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss3/4

4

1961]

Harvey: Contracts, Bills and Notes, and Sales

SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

the receipts are not to be construed as contracts and parol
evidence is admissible to vary their terms.
II. BILLS AND NOTES
Banl of Fort Mill v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.9 arose out of
the payment of a check by the bank whereon the endorsement had been forged. The forgery occurred in a loan closing in which Lawyers Title Insurance Company had insured
the title to the real estate and they paid the maker of the
check and took an assignment for all claims or causes of
action. Lawyers Title then brought action to recover from
the Bank of Fort Mill for the wrongful payment of the
check upon which the endorsement had been forged. The
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, reversed the
lower court's judgment for the plaintiff, holding since it
had paid the maker of the check in full and that claim had
been extinguished that this action was based on subrogation
and not on the assignment of a legal claim. Subrogation is
an equitable doctrine and will be elnforced according to the
dictates of equity and good conscience and independently of
contract provisions. Although the bank's liability to the
maker of the check mistakenly paid on a forgery is absolute,
as to the surety there is a balancing of the equities and since
the bank was innocent of any negligence in the transaction
the plaintiff here was not allowed to recover on the theory
of subrogation.

9. 268 F. 2d 313 (4th Cir. 1959).
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